The third-eldest brother in the family,Shigetoshi Mitsui,was already helping in the shop.Edo had become the seat of government of the Tokugawa family at the end of the sixteenth century,and in the1630s the sankin kotai system requiring daimyos to reside in Edo every sec ond year had been firmly established,and these factors led to its becom ing the largest city in the world,with a population of over one mil lion people,by the beginning of the eighteenth century.From around the1630s the Mitsui and many other merchants from the Matsusaka area,which was a commercially advanced region, would set up shops in Edo,a rapidly growing high-consumption city.
It so happened that Toshitsugu had expanded his business to include the sale of silk fabrics and kimonos,so he set up a silk-fabric stock wholesaling shop in Kyoto,which he himself managed,and he entrusted the management of the Edo shop to his younger brother Shigetoshi.Takatoshi was sent to Edo to help in his brothers'shop.
Another thing that must be remembered is that many of the powerful silk fabric traders at that time were setting up their principal shops in Kyoto in the form of stock wholesaling shops and would open retail branches in Edo.The reason for doing this was Kyoto's preeminence in regard to the collection and processing of silk fabrics.Since silk fabrics must go through dyeing and finishing processes before finally becoming merchandise,and these processes were almost complete ly the monopoly of the Kyoto area,the outlying regions of the coun A financial statement of the Edo Kimono Purveyor Office consisted of a trading account(which showed the amount of stock at hand at the beginning of the period,the amount of goods laid in during the period,the amount of sales during the period,the amount of stock at the end of the period,and the gross margin),a fund statement,a net income statement,and a balance sheet.In these financial state ments we can find such imperfections as the sum of cash in-flow (including cash remaining at the beginning of the period)and the sum of cash out-flow(including cash remaining at the end of the peri od)not agreeing,or there being considerable discrepancies(espe cially in the early financial statements)between the net income cal culated in the balance sheet and the net income shown in the statement of profit and loss.Still,double-entry bookkeeping was being aimed at.In the duplicates of the Kyoto Kimono Purveyor
Office financial statements,on the other hand,in the earliest peri ods the gross margin is calculated,but not only are there no entries of expenses or net income and an incomplete statement of profit and loss,there also is no balance sheet.Nevertheless,partway through, the net income on the statements of profits and loss and the net income on the balance sheets begin to agree;not only that,but all the numer ical figures,including those on the trading accounts and the fund state ments,are entered as debits and credits and agree exactly,so that it becomes perfect double-entry bookkeeping. Seen from the standpoint of legal form,the Omotokata could be described as a family partnership in which the equity owners were the NISHIKAWA:Divisional Management in the House of Mitsui109
Graph2. that the latter ceased being a profit center;since no relevant finan cial statements are extant,however,this is not clear.After the establishment of the Omotokata in1710,the Edo Kimono Shop had a constant deficit account because the(internal transfer)purchasing prices of goods sent to it from the Kyoto Kimono Shop were set at the sales prices (though there was an allowance for raising or lowering the ticketed prices within a permissible range),so,except for goods the shop had purchased itself,it was unable to record a gross margin.It might be noted in this connection that in the first and second halves of1711, of the Kyoto Kimono Shop's sales80%and78%,respectively,were to the Edo Kimono Shop,while83%and84%,respectively,of the pur chases of the Edo Kimono Shop were dependent on the Kyoto Kimono Shop. -1995/12 (which were all considered to be profit centers)in the same way as if it were applying to a completely owned subsidiary an equity method that a parent company today would apply to an associated company.In other words,it added the profits of each of the three shops to its own earnings,and it would increase its investment accounts in the three shops,which made up its assets,for an amount equivalent to what each shop's profits were(since double-entry book keeping was being used,each item always was both a debtor and a creditor).In contrast,when it came to the Edo Kimono Shop,it showed net assets after mentioning the totals of assets and liabilities and produced a consolidated balance sheet,but in the consolidated statement of profit and loss Edo Kimono Shop's net loss was added in with Kyoto Kimono Shop's own expenses. In the two silk yarn wholesalers(the Kyoto Yarn Shop and the Kyoto Ainomachi Yarn Shop),in contrast,not only the bad debt and con struction reserves but even the reserves for employees'bonuses and retirement allowances were those two shops'own net profit distrib ution items.As well,if actual profit exceeded standard profit,the extra profit was not transferred to the Kyoto Banking Shop but held over in those shops.It is possible that these differences between the two banking shops and the two silk yarn wholesalers that were subordi nate to the Kyoto Banking Shop reflected differences in the type of business they were carrying out.Still,that may not be the only rea son;perhaps another reason might be the fact that both of the two silk yarn wholesalers were shops not originally founded by the Mitsui family itself but shops that became a part of the Mitsui organization through forfeited pawn or managerial subrogation.
THE ACCOUNTING SYSTEM OF THE OMOTOKATA
The Omotokatawaited for the Kyoto Kimono Shop and the Kyoto Banking Shop to present their financial statements and those of their subor dinate shops every settlement term(i.e.,every half year)before pro ducing its own statement of accounts.As a result its statement of accounts would be completed and then reported and approved at a meeting of the Omotokata from three to four months after the settlement date (this meeting would always be attended by from two to five influen tial members of the Mitsui family and the senior-ranking employees of the Kyoto Kimono Shop and the Kyoto Banking Shop). The statement of accounts of the Omotokata was made up of three parts:a balance sheet,a statement of profit and loss,and a calcula tion of equity.Up until the partitioning of the enterprise in1775when the Mitsui family split into three groups,premises were not reckoned in the balance sheet but the sum paid to acquire a premise was shown on the statement of profit and loss as an expense,while the sum received from sale of a premise was shown as a revenue;consequently,in the calculation-of-equity portion of the statement the appraised value of premises was added and a revised computation of capital stock was made.Until1775all the premises owned by the House of Mitsui belonged to the Omotokata.Now,while the net assets of Mitsui's Kyoto Kimono Shop and Kyoto Banking Shop were separately classified as fixed cap ital investment from the Omotokata,or unappropriated retained earn ings,or reserves,the Omotokata treated owners'equity from which the reserves were excluded as its capital stock.Hence,in the calculation -of-equity portion of the Omotokata's statement of accounts,first of all the net income was added to the amount of capital stock without premis es from the end of the previous period,from this total the reserve transfer sums were subtracted(sometimes,however,the transfer sums to a reserve were entered in the statement of profit and loss, and sometimes cash receipts from loan interest were not acknowledged as earnings and placed directly into a reserve without going through the step of being counted as income or capital),and the sum for cap ital stock without premises at the end of the period was worked out. Next,to that total was added the appraised value of premises,to show a revised end-of-period capital stock value.Then the capital stock with premises was divided by220,the total number of equities,mul tiplied by the equity held by each house in the Mitsui family(62for the eldest son,30for the second son,etc.),to give the equity total for each house.
The total amount of assets(without premises)of the Omotokata for the first half of1722came to 12,254kan(the living expenses for one year of a family of three living in a city was approximately one kan); 9,798kan,or79.9%of the total,was the balance of investments in and loans to the shops under its control(45.2%to the Kyoto Kimono 116JAPANESE YEARBOOK ON BUSINESS HISTORY-1995/12 Shop,25.5%to the Kyoto Banking Shop,and9.2%to the other shops),and13.3%,or1,626kan,was money hoarded away in an underground cellar and similar places for emergencies.On the other hand the capital liabilities of the Omotokata consisted of10,153kan (82.8%)of capital stock without premises,and389kan(3.1%)and 1,019kan(8.3%)of money entrusted to it by the Kyoto Kimono Shop and the Kyoto Banking Shop,respectively,with most of the remain der being reserves.Borrowing money from sources outside the House of Mitsui was forbidden by the House regulations,and Omo tokata liabilities from external sources stood at this time at no more than29kan(0.24%).In addition,premises were worth2,980kan,and revised capital stock was13,133kan.
As mentioned earlier,the Omotokata disbursed funds to the shops under its control.During the period up to the partitioning of the enter prise in1775these investments and loans could be divided into three types:1)loans at interest in response to the demands for funds of the subordinate shop(the higher the loan balance the lower the rate of interest);2)fixed capital investments instead of receiving from the shops fixed returns or dividends;3)transferring the retained earn ings of the shops every six periods(i.e.,every three years). difficulties stemmed from bad debts receivable in two problem areas: loans to daimyos(the House of Mitsui was placed in a position in which it could hardly refuse the requests for loans being made by its feudal lord,the Tokugawa family of Kishu,and other Bakufu daimyos),and loans to members of the Mitsui family(having grown accustomed to luxurious lifestyles,some found that the fixed returns,or dividends, that they were receiving from the Omotokata were insufficient to meet their needs,and so they would resort to borrowing from the Omotokata). From Graph3it would appear that,following the reduction in the nominal figures for receivables and payables in1719in the wake of the Bakufu's switch from the old gold and silver currency to a new gold and silver currency,up to1774the Omotokata's capital stock was increasing at a steady favorable pace.Still,of the82,063kan of total assets without premises held by the Omotokata at the end of the sec ond half of1774,46.5%(38,141kan)were bad debts receivable, mostly in the form of loans to daimyos(36.8%)and loans to Mitsui family houses(8.5%),and18.1%(14,880kan)were fictitious assets. These fictitious assets represented the cash that had been hoarded in underground cellars and the like for emergencies,but that had been washed away when the money was diverted for operating funds given to shops strapped for funds or for daimyo loans,and yet was still entered into the ledgers every time it was diverted,as a fictitious liability of the same amount as the amount washed away.On the other hand,the Omotokata's capital and liabilities for the same period stood at50,099kan of capital stock without premises,11,751kan of reserves,and14,880kan of fictitious liabilities,with5,333kan worth of debts payable from pure borrowing from external sources. In addition it had8,372kan of premises,so that the revised capital stock with premises was58,471kan.
Besides the problems caused by increasing bad debts receivable and fictitious assets,there were problems within the House of Mitsui itself.Discord that arose in the1730s and1740s over who would take over the name Hachireiemon in representing the House of Mitsui or because of the way in which Takahira Mitsui's eldest son,Takafusa (eldest son in the third generation,1684-1748),added two house holds to the number of houses that were equity owners in the Omotokata(hiving off3and2.5worth of equity from the10that had earlier been set aside for surplus)for the sake of his own sons,came to a head 
